Abstract
INTRODUCTION
What are the drivers behind the upsurge in Indo-Burmese countermilitancy cooperation after decades of disengagement? The areas along the 1,643 km India-Myanmar border have since the 1950s been a scene of ethno-nationalist-driven, low-intensity conflict, deteriorating the state-tostate relationship. Cooperation in fighting transnational militant groups and Burmese attempts at curbing India-hostile militants for decades has been lukewarm, at best. Their relationship has despite periodical and partial upswings been characterized by disengagement and distrust, even hostility.
1 In early 2017, Indian Assamese police forces assessed that 2,500 Indian militants were residing in sanctuaries in Myanmar. 2 A further complicating matter is that the Burmese have a ceasefire agreement with militants that actively launch cross-border attacks into Indian Territory, and once were a shared security threat. India, on its side, no longer seems to host anti-Burmese militants.
Despite this severe and continuing challenge, in recent years a spirit of cooperation has appeared as a more prominent feature in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation for the first time. In the past decade, the two states have signed comprehensive cooperative agreements on intelligence, border patrolling, as well as initiated exchange programs and joint exercises on counter-militancy.
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Grounded partly in a growing literature seeking to explain militant impacts on interstate relations and existing literature on India-Myanmar relations, this article furthers expectations regarding the drivers of increased IndoBurmese counter-militancy cooperation. Examining the drivers of enhanced cooperation in an ambivalent interstate relationship despite resilient militancy and a long conflict provides nuances significant for understanding the complicated dynamics of the regional great power-small power IndoBurmese relations. It throws light on the impact of militancy on a complex interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation.
The following section generates assumptions about the drivers of countermilitancy cooperation, before providing a status of counter-militancy cooperation in the Indo-Burmese dyad. This is followed by an explanation of the cooperation, and finally, a conclusion.
historical and present nature of the interstate relationship; the base state and target states' relations with third-party states; perceptions of the security threat including the agenda of the militant groups; and, finally, economic cooperation including expectations for the future. 4 The assumed drivers of Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation provide structure to the analysis.
First, counter-militancy cooperation is part of the overall progress in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation is dual-faced. Besides direct cooperation, Naypyidaw and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's armed forces, have pragmatically accepted India's sovereignty-breaching moves.
While India has increased its presence in its northeast and successfully established deals with many militants, other groups -such as the NSCN-K, the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), and the Coordination Committee (CorCom)-remain active. They allegedly hide in Burmese territory and conduct cross-border strikes targeting Indian soldiers, particularly in the Indian provinces of Manipur and Nagaland.
In recent years, Bangladesh and Bhutan have largely ceased to function as a safe haven for India-hostile militants, and Bhutan has a comprehensive security agreement with India. 27 The consequence is that non-signatory militant groups increasingly depend on cross-border sanctuaries on
Burmese territory for survival, and allegedly also on Chinese territory.
28
Applying terrorist tactics, the militants launch cross-border attacks on the Indian Army and civilians. Naypyidaw's 2012 ceasefire agreement with NSCN-K limits Burmese security force presence in the group's territory.
29
This access to extraterritorial sanctuary has secured the effectiveness of the militants and limited India's room for maneuver in securing its strategically important northeast. 30 The challenge is amplified by the fact that, for the Burmese, the cost of curbing the India-hostile militants is likely lower than the benefit. Myanmar has more severe security challenges involving separatist militants on its borders with China and
Thailand. The Tatmadaw has conducted cross-border raids into Thai territory and urged China to stop harboring Myanmar-hostile militants, which have added much tension in these relations.
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The Although much points to the aftermath of India's cross-border strike as a case of pragmatic acceptance, it is only rational to not totally dismiss the option that there was no acceptance from the Burmese side and that continuing cooperation was the result of a 'rescue mission' by the Indian high-level delegation that travelled to Naypyidaw shortly after. Regardless of whether the acceptance was pragmatic or forced, as it did not lead to higher levels of conflict, it illustrates a nuance between cooperation and conflict in interstate relations. The following section further examines what has made cooperation possible despite the highly conflict-inflicting factor of resilient transnational militancy and even breaches of sovereignty.
THE DRIVERS OF INDO-BURMESE COUNTER-MILITANCY COOPERATION
The following section focus on the four categories of drivers: The nature of the interstate relationship; the relations with third-party states;
perceptions of the security threat; and economic cooperation.
First, in the India-Burma case one could argue that the dyad has ripened enough to forge counter-militancy cooperation. However, border and India gains muscles as a competitor against China and moves closer to its overarching strategic aims. According to Gautam Sen, who has held a senior position in a northeast state government, unrest in Indian Nagaland has decreased. Despite this, the Indian central government has declared it a disturbed area, which has allowed for continued military presence.
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As the situation between India and China has become increasingly tense in recent years, it is only to be expected that more security forces will be deployed in India's peripheries that are close to China.
Furthermore, a factor that has made India pick up speed is Myanmar's opening to the international community. This implies more international competition in Myanmar, and may contribute to explaining Modi's push for more cooperation with Naypyidaw at a time when the international community is threatening to pull out. Moreover, if a host state, after pressure from the target state, is likely to compel but fail in curbing the militants, the militants may grow stronger and the host state's capacity weaker: A so-called compellence dilemma.
Another incentive for India's interest in Myanmar is
This may again cause a deteriorated security situation for the target state.
In such cases, the target state may refrain from coercion and punishment of the host. 52 In addition, counter-militancy cooperation can serve to de-escalate crises in the form of, for instance, permissive hot pursuits.
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Important to note is that target states' behavior vis-à-vis host states in the wake of transnational militancy can at times be explained by triadic deterrence, meaning that the target state applies threat and punishment against the host state in order to coerce it into curbing the hostile transnational militants.
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Furthermore, and importantly, the agenda of the militants and the threat they pose to the host and target states is central in forming the incentives for counter-militancy cooperation. Cases where the militants also work against the interests of the host state indicate low capacity rather than lack of will of the host state to combat them. This point of departure is less intimidating than direct support where the host state, for instance, provides the militants with arms and training facilities. In addition, the principal conflict-inflicting problem of sanctuary as a condition for militant organization survival becomes a bit more approachable. The target state's perception of the host state's efforts in curbing the militants is also important. A total lack of interest from the host state in hindering What has changed is that India has become more assertive and willing to actively counter Chinese influence, and that Myanmar is increasingly the main base for the militants. Moreover, India has successfully expanded counter-militancy cooperation with Bhutan and Bangladesh, which are central to stability in the northeast. This may nurture the optimism concerning similar cooperation with Myanmar.
India has been seeking to seal the Indo-Burmese border without much success. There was no mutual agreement regarding the border until 1967, and it has since been semi-demarcated by boundary pillars. In 2013, India unsuccessfully attempted to build a 10 km border fence. In addition, the main agenda of NSCN-K, which has posed the most significant challenge in recent years, is to fight for an autonomous Naga state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. It has previously carried out attacks in both India and Myanmar. NSCN-K has been designated a terrorist organization by India. In essence, the group's original agenda implies that it poses a threat towards India and Myanmar, both target and host. However, the lack of safe hideouts decreases longterm survivability of transnational militants, which may lead to loose and complicated agreements between host states and militants. NSCN-K's original agenda may contribute to easing counter-militancy cooperation for the target state, but is complicated by Myanmar's ceasefire agreement with the group. As long as India views the Burmese sanctuary as a question of a lack of capacity to curb the militants, rather than will, it may serve as a driver of cooperation. Large-scale foreign infrastructure projects in unsettled territory come with a security price tag, as also seen in China's economic expansion abroad. The strategic nature of the economic cooperation potential is a significant driver in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation and, more importantly, the region will see no settlement without Burmese The target state's perceptions of the host state's capacity and efforts to curb the militants are central in furthering cooperation. In addition, extraterritorial militants cannot be curbed without cooperation of the host state. Either because of lack of will or capacity, Naypyidaw and the Tatmadaw are providing sanctuary to the militants that sustain transnational militancy -the success factor for transnational militants. By pragmatic acceptance of Indian hot pursuits across the border, they do signal lack of capacity rather than will. The perception that the host state lacks capacity is an enabler for counter-militancy cooperation. The fact that Naga militants in their primary aim of an autonomous state pose a threat to both India and Myanmar, eases cooperation and adds to the view that the Tatmadaw lacks capacity to curb the militants.
From an Indian perspective, engaging Myanmar, in combination with striking deals with militant groups, has till now proven to be the most 
